As the Trump Administration prepares to take office in Washington, DC, it inherits a military teetering on the edge of being unable to sustain prolonged combat operations. The Navy is decommissioning ships faster than they are being replaced and now has more admirals than active ships, even as it reduces its number of enlisted sailors (Trump Picks Navy Outsider to Fix a Thoroughly Broken Service). Meanwhile, the Air Force is grappling with a significant loss of experienced pilots, driven in part by its contentious approach toward white male aviators (Unexpectedly, the USAF Finds Itself With a Critical Shortage of Pilots While It Says It Has Too Many White Officers). However, it is the Army that appears to be fundamentally compromised at its core.
More than half of the Army‘s senior officers are turning down opportunities to command, choosing instead the stability of staff roles over the high-stakes demands of leadership, or retiring, according to internal service data.
The Battalion Command Assessment Program, or BCAP, a cornerstone of the Army’s effort to evaluate leadership readiness, assesses 800 to 1,000 lieutenant colonels annually through interviews, psychological tests and physical fitness evaluations.
Historically, 85% of those participants have been deemed fit for command. Yet this year, 54% of eligible officers voluntarily chose not to participate — a significant uptick from the 40% average opt-out rate seen since 2019.
It is difficult to imagine a more damning critique of any army than the fact that over half of eligible officers voluntarily withdraw from consideration for command roles.
The article attributes this trend to issues like work-life balance and family pressures, suggesting these factors deter officers from pursuing what should be the pinnacle of an Army career: battalion command. While commanding a battalion is essential for officers aspiring to rise through the ranks and become generals, it is also at this level that leaders have the greatest opportunity to influence soldier training and identify future enlisted and commissioned leaders. I’ve known officers who took on battalion command and retired shortly afterward, much to the dismay of Army personnel managers—but, as the saying goes, “f*** ’em if they can’t take a joke.”
However, based on conversations with acquaintances in the Army officer corps who are eligible for battalion command, the real issue runs deeper. Many highly qualified officers are declining these roles not due to personal concerns but because of the toxic command climate within the Army.
One major problem is micromanagement. Advanced technology allows higher echelons to monitor commanders at every level in real-time. This constant oversight, combined with an overwhelming focus on mandatory training tied to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives and Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) requirements, leaves little room for commanders to focus on unit training. As a company commander, I once took my company downrange for four weeks—a feat that would be almost impossible under today’s constraints.
Another significant issue is fear. Commanders are increasingly hesitant to discipline soldiers, fearing career-ending repercussions for decisions that might draw scrutiny or controversy.
“I work in a position where I encounter many of the O-5s and E-9s in that group. An alarming amount of them seem low-key dreading facing the “weaponized investigation” culture that is currently pervasive. Combine that with the paltry manning (but perception from higher that everything must still get done as if they were 100%) and it is absolutely not surprising to me that the command opt-in is down.”
I came across the term “weaponized investigation” in an email discussion group I’m part of. Essentially, the Inspector General system has been turned into a tool to target and undermine commanders. If you enforce discipline too strictly (is that phrase even acceptable anymore?), someone is bound to accuse you of being homophobic, sexist, or racist. Acquaintances have mentioned that any negative interaction with a female soldier can escalate quickly under the Army’s SHARP framework, with allegations of sexual harassment or discrimination coming into play. As Rush Limbaugh used to say, it’s not the quality of the evidence but the gravity of the accusation that triggers an investigation.
The DEI rot in the military is worse than even I feared, apparently.
— Cynical Publius (@CynicalPublius) December 16, 2024
My posts linked below, and the responses to them, have been a bit surprising, even to me. I knew there was a DEI rot at the top levels of the Pentagon, but I don’t think I realized until now the full corrosive… https://t.co/hAe1SbyYq0
The standard of proof seems to be whether someone’s feelings were hurt, rather than whether the discipline was justified. An IG report citing hurt feelings can result in a General Officer Letter of Reprimand, effectively ending your career.
The DEI rot in the military is worse than even I feared, apparently.
— Cynical Publius (@CynicalPublius) December 16, 2024
My posts linked below, and the responses to them, have been a bit surprising, even to me. I knew there was a DEI rot at the top levels of the Pentagon, but I don’t think I realized until now the full corrosive… https://t.co/hAe1SbyYq0
However, and back to the present day, what I’m hearing as a result of the reposts below and in private DMs is that today the mere existence of such a claim of racism, sexism, or (nowadays) homophobia, regardless of whether there is any substantiating proof to it, is enough for a commander to be relieved from command for cause because the senior chain of command has suffered a “loss in confidence” in that commander.
(FYI, I personally know of a senior officer who was relieved over a “loss in confidence” because of a racism claim, even though the IG investigation revealed that there was zero racism of any kind. However, the MERE EXISTENCE of that claim, regardless of its inaccuracy, was enough to cause that “loss in confidence.” I would dearly love to tell that story in full, but I’m sworn to secrecy.)
So basically, if you are a U.S. military unit commander in 2024, you necessarily live in fear of some subordinate claiming that you are a racist or a sexist or a homophobe, regardless of whether there is even the slightest hint of truth to the claim. I can promise you that the fear of such unwarranted claims being successful will compromise the judgment and leadership of anyone faced with such fear. A military unit or ship cannot function as a combat-effective force when its commander lives in the shadow of such fear. It cannot. And the service members in such a combat ineffective unit or ship will suffer—and some will die—as a result.
Some time ago, I read a similar account about the Navy, describing how petty officers were left doing tasks like buffing floors and general ship maintenance while sailors stood idle—because leaders feared the career risks of issuing unpopular orders. Unfortunately, I wasn’t smart enough to save the link.
It’s one thing for officers to step away from the command track for family reasons. It’s something entirely different when they leave because of the risks involved. The darker side of this is that those who remain in the command-selection pool are often individuals who thrive under the current flawed system—and they are the ones most likely to rise to general officer ranks.
Trump’s pick for Secretary of the Army, Daniel Driscoll (a former Army Ranger and advisor to JD Vance), will inherit a monumental crisis when he assumes the role. Integrity appears to be optional at the highest levels of Army leadership. The current Army Chief of Staff, for example, reportedly conspired with a now-dismissed general to circumvent command-selection rules and place the general’s mistress—who wasn’t qualified—on the list (Army Secretary Fires a Corrupt Four-Star but Leaves Corruption at the Top Untouched).
Typically, the Army Secretary stays out of the operational affairs of the uniformed side. However, given the Army’s current state, Driscoll will need to take a hands-on approach to address the dysfunction and carry out the necessary overhaul (The Pentagon Is Afraid of the ‘Purge’ List Prepared for Hegseth but It Is Not Big Enough to Do the Job).
